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Social interaction implies a set of behaviors that can notably 
be broken down into the terms reciprocity, loyalty, equity, altruism, 
benevolence and trust, or conversely, punishment and retaliation. 
This type of prosocial behavior raises a problem for conventional 
economic theory, according to which individuals, supposedly 
substantively rational, will pursue their strict self-interest, which, in 
most cases, will win out over all other considerations (Stigler, 1981). 
Admittedly, it might be rational to act in an “altruistic” or 
“cooperative” manner if the expected gains are higher than for 
adopting more individualistic behavior at first glance (Wintrobe and 
Breton, 1986; Kreps, 1990; Kreps and Wilson, 1982). In infinitely 
repeated games, the folk theorem suggests an infinite number of 
non-equilibrium strategies in which the fear of retaliation (i.e. 
punishment of players that defect) constitutes the basis for possible, 
but not systematic, cooperative behavior. Sometimes, this possibility 
is assimilated to “socially normative” behavior, but players are 
presumed to act always in pursuit of their strict material self-
interest.3 Although based on a hypothesis of bounded rationality, 
Williamson (1993) also considers cooperative behavior to be the 
result of a calculation in terms of comparative risks and rewards. 
The institutional context and the specific environment in which the 
transaction takes place are guides for this calculation, and 
cooperation emerges when interests converge. Conversely, when the 
possibility of mutual gains does not appear certain from the outset, 
the hypothesis of pure self-interest means that prosocial behavior 
appears inconceivable.  
In any case, for a single interaction, standard economic 
theory offers no explanation for the emergence of such prosocial 
behavior. Yet a very large number of experiments based on the 
                                            
1 LEM (Paris II)-University of Picardy 
2 CRIISEA-University of Picardy 
3 In this type of game, it is always possible to achieve a higher gain than the 
minimax value if the discount factor is high enough (Fudenberg and Maskin, 
1986). 
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ultimatum game, the dictator game and the trust game (Camerer, 
2003; Henrich, 2001 and 2004; Roth et al., 1991, for an overview), 
while not necessarily invalidating the postulate of strict economic 
rationality, at least raise a contradiction by highlighting the existence 
of altruistic and cooperative behavior. Recent discoveries in 
neuroscience have contributed new information on decision-making 
during social interaction. Referring notably to emotions, these 
discoveries pave the way to understanding why individuals do not 
systematically behave opportunistically in a single interaction. 
The term “emotion” encompasses the sensation of pleasure of 
displeasure following the perception of a set of external or internal 
stimuli. It is the result of an interaction of subjective and objective 
factors that activate the neural and endocrinal systems. These 
systems generate autonomous responses that are detected by the 
hypothalamus, without involving conscious control. These responses 
may induce behavioral and somato-vegetative reactions described as 
emotional experience. In other words, adverse or pleasant stimuli 
prepare the body for behavioral responses (fight, aggression, etc.), 
whereas the limbic system intervenes in awareness and modulates 
behavior by adapting it. The behavioral reaction is thus modulated 
by individual reactivity (i.e. the personality), the environment of the 
situation and cognitive behavioral control.  
Economists have only been interested in the role of emotion 
in decision-making for a relatively short period of time. Admittedly, 
some great authors have sporadically mentioned emotions as a 
parameter determining behavior. In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
Smith points out the importance of empathy, gratitude, resentment, 
deference and jealousy in social life. Bentham’s utilitarism in the 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation includes 
everything that is source of “happiness” in the community. Keynes 
considers the “animal spirits” that influence human behavior in his 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Simon’s selection 
theory links altruism to bounded rationality. Further, Simon (1967) 
proposes a complex behavioral model in which emotions interfere 
with the motivational system that controls the hierarchy of 
objectives. More recently, Hirshleifer (1987), Frank (1988), Ménard 
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(1994), Casson (1997), and Nooteboom (2002)4 lay stress on the 
importance of emotions. However, there was no overall examination 
of the pertinence or the limitations of the homo economicus 
paradigmatic trajectory until the contributions of Elster (1996, 
1998), Loewenstein (2000) and Thaler (2000).  
Elster’s perspective is one of extended rational choice, which 
integrates social and natural constraints (including biological ones). 
He questions the failures of formal rationality and presents the 
possibility of integrating emotions into a cost/reward model. 
Attributing a value to emotional gratification or displeasure and 
calculating the marginal utility or non-utility of emotions makes it 
possible for him to build an indifference curve and to identify 
potential trade-offs. He also emphasises emotion as a factor that 
resolves the indetermination of a rational choice in contexts that are 
uncertain, complex and lack transparency. Thus, emotions would 
fulfill the orientation of attention function identified by Simon by 
limiting the scope of actions and enabling the “right decision” to be 
made.5 Thaler adopts a more neutral approach by suggesting simply 
that economic analysis should gradually integrate a more emotional 
homo economicus. Conversely, the contribution of Loewenstein et al. 
(2001), relating notably to decision-making in situations of high 
uncertainty, introduces a more radical proposition. By distinguishing 
between anticipated emotions, expected to be experienced in the 
future, and immediate emotions, experienced at the moment a 
decision is made, Loewenstein highlights the fact that some 
behavioral effects are not subject to logical evaluation and in any 
case cannot be attributed to substantive reasoning.  
From this standpoint, once a stimulus occurs, we could 
observe the following loop: emotion  behavior  emotion. The first 
                                            
4 Ménard (op. cit. p. 202) speaks of “emotional ties... that are based on the 
principles of equity and solidarity”, Casson (op. cit. pp. 135-136) mentions 
“emotional reward” as a motivation, whereas Nooteboom (op. cit. pp.42-43) 
underscores the role of the affective as a foundation for trust and “the 
rationality of emotions”, emphasising the psychological mechanisms that 
foster benevolent behavior. Citing the teachings of evolutionary psychology, 
he even affirms the existence of selection based on trust – said to be written 
into the genes – since the prehistorical era when survival depended on 
collective hunting and gathering activities (from this standpoint, for the vast 
majority of human beings, it would be psychologically unbearable to live in a 
state of continuous mistrust). On a more specific level, Frank and Hirshleifer 
point out the fact that emotions facilitate cooperative relationships by 
shifting the priority away from the consequences of decisions. 
5 For Elster, the perception of emotions reflects the author’s intellectual 
trajectory and, logically, is open to debate. The same holds true, among 
other things, for the intentionality of an emotion (Elster, 1996, p. 1387), 
which amounts to highlighting only expected emotions depending on the 
resulting decision.  
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leg (emotion  behavior) essentially involves the effect of immediate 
emotions (i.e. a reaction induced by an emotional state), whereas the 
second (behavior  emotion) refers to expected emotions integrated 
into a deliberative process (behavior is oriented towards seeking a 
certain emotion). 
Our objective is to understand how immediate emotions, the 
search for positive emotions or the avoidance of negative emotions 
can determine our actions, notably prosocial behavior. In an initial 
stage, the discoveries of neuroscience prompt us to qualify the 
interpretations typically made of these behaviors, be they calculative 
or normative. Prosocial behavior such as some acts of charity, 
cooperation, trust or punishment triggers gratification for those that 
exhibit such behavior. These decisions, which appear to be contrary 
to strict self-interest, are in fact sources of pleasure. They thus have 
egocentric determinants, without necessarily being the result of a 
deliberative process. This observation will enable us, in a second 
stage, to broaden the notion of rationality in order to reflect the 
emotional dimension of our actions. This is undoubtedly the price 
economists must pay to build a more realistic representation of 
decision-making based on the interactions between the deliberative 
and emotional systems.  
The first section of this article is therefore dedicated to 
presenting the experimental results that highlight individual types of 
prosocial behavior. The explanations typically put forward to explain 
such behavior will then be discussed. In the third section, the 
egocentric determinants of prosocial behavior will be identified 
thanks notably to the contributions of neuroscience. Lastly, the 
rationality of such behavior will be discussed in light of the emotional 
experiences and the complexity of cerebral processes during 
decision-making.  
  
2. Prosocial behavior: experimental results 
 
Experimental economics studies the behaviors in social 
interaction using a range of games: the ultimatum game (UG), the 
dictator game (DG), the public goods game (PG) and the trust game 
(TG). The UG (Guth et al., 1982) is a game in which two players must 
divide a monetary sum, S. The first player proposes how to divide the 
sum (α; S-α), wherein α is the portion he will keep, and (S-α) the 
portion for the second player. If the second player accepts this 
proposal, the sum is divided according to the terms laid out by the 
first player and the game is over; if the second player refuses, neither 
player receives anything and the game is over. Economic theory 
suggests that the second player will accept any division as long as he 
receives a sum equal to or greater than zero. Anticipating this, the 
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first player should rationally propose a division (S; 0), which 
constitutes the Nash equilibrium for this game.  
The DG is a “degenerate” version of the ultimatum game. 
Player 1 has an endowment that he can choose to share with player 
2 in any way he desires. Unlike in the previous game, player 2 has 
can not to refuse the division proposed by player 1. The sum is 
shared according to player 1’s proposal and the game ends. Strictly 
speaking, this game relates more to decision theory than to game 
theory, as there is no actual interaction between the two players. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical equilibrium of this game would consist 
of player 1 keeping the full sum and giving nothing to player 2.  
The PG illustrates the problem of financing a public good: 
each individual’s self-interest lies in a public good being produced 
without having to contribute to its financing. Thus, the PG involves 
five or six subjects, each endowed with ten experimental tokens. The 
players can place all or a portion of this endowment into a common 
pot. They also have the possibility of keeping all their tokens. Each 
token kept is worth two euros to its holder, whereas each token 
invested in the common pot results in a payout of one euro to each 
group member. Given the game’s rules, it would be rational to 
behave as a “free rider”: each player’s self-interest would lie in all the 
others contributing to finance the common pot, while not 
contributing himself. At equilibrium, no one would contribute to 
financing and the public good will not be produced.  
In the TG (Berg et al., 1995), two subjects take turns playing 
one after the other. Player 1 has an endowment and must decide 
whether he gives a portion of it to player 2. The amount given, if any, 
is multiplied (e.g. by a factor of 3x) by the experimenter  before being 
transferred to player 2. Player 2 must then decide what amount to 
send back to player 1. The game ends, and the players keep the 
amounts resulting from their interaction. The subgame perfect 
equilibrium solution would consist of player 2 sending nothing back 
to player 1. Player 1 would anticipate this choice, and thus give 
nothing to player 2 in the initial period. 
For each of these games, substantial multiethnic 
experimental data (Roth et al., 1991; Henrich et al., 2001; Cardenas 
and Carpenter, 2008) converge towards the observation that few 
players behave according to the teachings of standard economic 
theory. On the contrary, these games allow for a set of prosocial 
decisions and actions to be expressed. They reveal a large variety of 
behavior ranging from reciprocity to pure altruism or benevolence, as 
well as cooperation, trust, loyalty, or even costly punishment of 
opportunistic and inequitable behavior. 
In the PG, Ledyard (1995) observes that subjects send 
between 40% and 60% of their initial endowment to the common pot, 
even though cooperation decreases as the game is repeated. 
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Remarkably enough, Andréoni (1988) shows that by changing game 
players, the initial cooperation rate (for the first iteration of the game) 
is relatively constant, at 40-60%. The contribution to financing the 
public good reveals individuals’ tendency to cooperate and to go 
beyond the temptation to act opportunistically. In the TG (Berg et al., 
1995), players generally send a sum of money (around 50% of their 
endowment) whereas standard rationality would predict that they 
send nothing. This is undoubtedly the expression of a form of trust. 
Even though a strategic dimension may be at work in player 1’s 
decision6, player 2’s decision to send back money calls upon 
considerations of reciprocity and loyalty.  
On another level, the DG supplies an interesting 
measurement of the degree of benevolence and altruism of 
individuals. Players show a propensity to share their endowment 
with a stranger from whom they cannot hope to obtain any sort of 
gratification. In fact, the amounts given range from 20% to 47% of 
player 1’s endowment, regardless of whether players come from 
developed countries (the US, Sweden or Russia) or developing ones 
(Africa and South America, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana or Tanzania). In 
the UG, considerations of equity and justice also appear to be at 
work. The offerers (players 1) propose on average 40% of the total 
amount. The modal offer is an even 50/50 breakdown. A proposal 
deemed inequitable (i.e. equal to or less than 20%) is often punished 
(i.e. player 2 refuses the offer), which implies costs for both players 
and invalidates the theoretical prediction that a few euros are better 
than nothing at all (Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Blount, 1995; 
Camerer et al., 2004). Furthermore, comparing the amounts offered 
in the UG and in the DG enables us to separate out the purely 
altruistic dimension of player 1 and the strategic dimension of 
sharing (Cox, 2004). In the UG, player 1 may be tempted to make an 
“equitable” proposal as he anticipates that an excessively unfair 
proposal will be refused. Conversely, this risk does not exist in the 
DG. As a result, we can consider player 1’s gift in the DG to 
represent a measure of his altruism. 
In general, there is a strong tendency towards rewarding 
players that have behaved well in the past, i.e. by showing trust or 
benevolent and cooperative behavior, while punishing those that 
“defected”. Thus, in the TG and the UG, player 2, if treated fairly or 
entrusted with a generous amount by player 1, will tend to be 
generous in exchange or to accept player 1’s offer. Conversely, many 
subjects are prepared to punish free riders by incurring the cost of 
such punishment themselves (“altruistic punishment”), even when 
interactions are anonymous, there is no possible reputational effect 
                                            
6 Player 1 may adopt a gift/payback perspective, sending a “sign” of his good 
will and counting on player 2’s loyal behavior. 
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and the “righter of wrongs” does not personally suffer from the 
defection (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). 
“Fair punishment” behavior emerges and in fact proves to be quite 
robust. Many subjects will choose to punish, despite the non-nil cost 
for themselves, disloyal behavior in a single-game situation, in other 
words, without expecting any immediate or future payback (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000, for monetary punishment; Masclet et al., 2003, 
incorporating peer pressure). Furthermore, Ozgur et al. (2006) 
implemented a public goods game and showed that, when given the 
choice, players decide freely to play in an economy equipped with an 
institution that has the power to punish opportunistic individuals or 
defectors, rather than in an economy with institutions lacking 
sanctioning power. Such an attitude enables robust cooperation to 
emerge. 
 
3. Explanations for prosocial behavior 
 
These results reveal an inconsistency between the predictions 
of economic theory and observed behaviors. They emphasise that in 
addition to strict self-interest, other determinants enter into the 
decision-making process, notably motivations related to social 
interaction.  
Various interpretations of prosocial behavior coexist, and 
these do not always converge and often reflect the author’s 
theoretical and doctrinal prejudices. 
A first approach asserts that individuals that adopt prosocial 
behavior are strictly selfish and motivated by their own pecuniary 
gains, but equipped with limited rationality (Binmore et al., 1995). 
According to this approach, subjects are unable to identify their own 
self-interest immediately given their limited cognitive abilities, but, 
after a learning phase, there is convergence towards the subgame 
perfect equilibrium of standard theory. Internal criticism of these 
proposals are based on the fact that the experimental games are 
simple enough that a learning phase is not necessary (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 2005). Thus, the behavioral hypothesis must evolve to 
integrate other preferences. 
In this respect, “social preference” models, while maintaining 
the hypothesis of substantive rationality, postulate that individuals’ 
actions are not purely selfish. Prosocial behavior is considered to 
reflect another type of preference that could be integrated without 
difficulty as part of the utility function of rational individuals. The 
only difference compared to conventional approaches lies in the fact 
that the gains (and, generally speaking, the resources) of others, not 
just one’s own gains, are part of the bundle (hence the altruism 
shown in certain game situations, for instance). In other words, a 
value could be allocated to these preferences, enabling them to be 
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ranked. For some individuals in certain circumstances, prosocial 
preferences will win. Thus, in the end, prosocial behavior would 
result from a deliberative process based on calculation. 
The most well-known of these models are those that 
underscore the principles of reciprocity and equity. Equity enables 
contribution and retribution to be taken into account, with the 
notion of proportionality between the two (Homans, 1974; Adams, 
1963). Reciprocal behavior can be considered the result of an equity 
norm. The equality principle, on the contrary, is aimed at ensuring 
that each individual receives an equal share (Deutsch, 1975) with an 
identical distribution of rewards to all. In light of the experimental 
results, we could pick out a priority rule: in a context in which 
neither of the players contributes to the endowment through any sort 
of effort, the equality norm appears to prevail. Conversely, in a 
configuration in which one or the other player supplies an effort (in 
the form of work, good will, etc.), the equity norm emerges.  
Two main models illustrate individuals’ preference for an 
equal distribution of gains due to a subject’s discomfort when he has 
more, or less, than others. Fehr and Schmidt’s model (1999), firstly, 
postulates that individuals’ satisfaction depends not only on their 
endowment, but also on an envy coefficient, if they have less than 
others, or a guilt coefficient, if they have more. Secondly, the ERC 
(Equity, Reciprocity, Competition) model, put forth by Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000), is similar to that of Fehr and Schmidt in its 
interpretation but formally different in that individuals are interested 
in the average and seek to be treated in a similar manner. They do 
not want to have less than others, but are also ready to sacrifice a 
portion of their endowment if they have more than the average. In 
both cases, individuals feel discomfort that prompts them to reject 
offers that they deem unfair in the ultimatum game.  
Research into altruism (Andréoni, 1990) focuses on 
individuals that value charitable acts while revealing that only a 
minority of them behave in an unconditionally altruistic fashion, as 
the utility of charitable acts is tightly and directly correlated to the 
payments received by the partner. Charness and Rabin (2002) 
propose a model that combines a particular form of aversion to 
inequity and altruistic preferences, whereby individuals seek the 
social wellbeing of the group they belong to. 
Intention-based models of reciprocity examine the reciprocal 
fairness based on the intentions attributed to others (Rabin, 1993; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). 
These models are based on a theory of mind that refers to the 
capacity to envisage others’ intentions, beliefs and desires. According 
to these models, individuals seek to put themselves in another’s 
place in order to adapt their own behavior. They will make an 
equitable proposal if they believe that their partner has good 
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intentions, while their proposals will be less equitable towards 
partners whose intentions are deemed hostile. McCabe et al. (2003) 
thus set up a trust game with two possible scenarios, the first in 
which player 1 intentionally entrusts the other with a sum, and the 
second wherein his “trust” is “involuntary” (he has no choice other 
than to send a sum to player 2). This experiment showed that player 
2 rewarded player 1’s generosity much more when it was intentional 
than when it was “required” by the test protocol.  
Another variant is proposed by “interdependent preference” 
models, which address the problem of resource allocation (payments) 
based on the other player’s type (“good” or “bad”). The central 
question that these models attempt to answer, concerns differences 
in behavior shown by a single person. The explanation is apparently 
that a player’s altruistic preferences will be stronger towards another 
altruistic player (Levine, 1998). In this case, each player’s decisions 
will not depend solely on the actions of another, but also on the 
information transmitted via that action concerning the other 
individual’s type. These models are particularly complex due to the 
interdependence of preferences.  
Almost all versions of social preference theories mobilise 
conventional economic tools – except for intention-based reciprocity 
models, which apply psychological game theory – and start off by 
formulating a few hypotheses regarding players’ utility function. Yet 
the question that may be raised involves the reasons behind these 
egalitarian preoccupations or sensitivity to others’ intentions or 
personality. This is a missing link to understanding the prosocial 
tendencies of a large number of individuals. While taking into 
account prosocial motivations is a considerable step forward, we 
nevertheless need to cast light on the processes behind such 
behavior. 
An alternative answer would be to ascribe such behavior to 
the strength of social norms. A social norm has three basic 
characteristics: it induces recurring, regular behavior; it is based on 
a shared social belief that is imposed on the individual; and lastly, it 
is applied with the use of informal sanctions (e.g. exclusion). 
Prosocial behavior would thus be caused by normativity, equivalent 
to an ethical value, entering into conflict with self-interest7.  
Social normativity approaches do indeed postulate a priori 
conformity to a norm – determined by the history of the social groups 
                                            
7 Some authors do assimilate the social norm into a repeated game involving 
reputational effects (Binmore, 1998). In their view, the decisions resulting 
from such a norm are no different from those leading to the long-term 
maximisation of one’s own gains. Yet Fehr and Schmidt (2005) underscore 
that there is little chance in a one-shot game of individuals applying 
“normative” behavior adapted to repeated games.  
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in question – that is imposed exogenously on individuals and 
involves breaking with the strict principle of defending one’s material 
self-interest. Yet while the norm is a crucial factor, there are 
formidable analytic problems in the explanations put forward for the 
search for reciprocity and for conditioning one’s actions to those of 
others (Cordonnier, 1997). The limitations of oversocialised 
approaches are the mirror reflection of those of undersocialised ones 
(Granovetter, 1985). Firstly, because an action often precedes the 
formation of a shared representation (Weick, 1979, 1995) and 
nothing allows us to affirm that an abstract, general norm is imposed 
outside the context of the individuals and characteristics involved in 
a specific interaction. Secondly, sacrifice and pure altruism are not 
generalised principles of human behavior (Robin and Ruffieux, 1999; 
Bénamou and Tirole, 2006). Experimental results show that while a 
very large number of individuals adopt prosocial attitudes, this may 
change depending on the game rules, and other individuals 
nevertheless act selfishly.  
It is interesting to note that some versions of the public goods 
game also observe negative “prosocial” attitudes: free riders, 
punished when their defection is revealed, seek revenge by counter-
punishment behavior (Nikiforakis, 2008; Gächter et al., 2008a). This 
is probably why more conventional explanations are reaffirmed, such 
as the advantages obtained from the free riders (Fowler, 2005), long-
term gains resulting from punishment (Gächter et al., 2008b) or 
incentives linked to reputational effects (Bénamou and Tirole, 2006).  
In any case, the fact remains that these prosocial behaviors, 
either positive or negative, are irrational in light of the teachings of 
conventional economic theory, as they often lead to economic losses 
for the protagonists. This means that determinants other than the 
strict pursuit of material self-interest are involved in the decision-
making process. Nor can these determinants be oversimplified to 
normative social motivations. In this sense, the frequency of 
prosocial behavior implies the existence of an emotion sparked by 
interaction with another individual. It is therefore reasonable to 
suppose that normativity derives from individual mental processes 
that orient attitude. 
 
4. Prosocial effects but egocentric determinants  
 
Taking into account emotional parameters enables us to 
better explain the why of irrational behavior from a strict economic 
standpoint. Neuroscience has highlighted the role played by the 
reward and punishment circuits, two major motivational systems for 
the individual. These circuits are at the core of our mental activity 
and play an important role in learning and memory. They motivate 
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action in order to satisfy instinctive impulses and avoid painful 
experiences. They orient all our behavior. 
With regard to the reward circuit, we distinguish the 
mechanisms responsible for the emotion triggered by obtaining an 
award from those that enable future rewards to be anticipated and 
expected, controlling goal-oriented behavior. Rewards first involve a 
subjective feeling of pleasure and spark positive emotions. The 
reward circuit (or the punishment circuit) is then activated without 
anticipating or “seeking”. In this case, behavioral reactions will not 
be controlled logically and will not result from deliberation. Rewards 
can also be apprehended as an end in themselves, thus triggering 
exploratory behaviors (Schultz, 2000). Lastly, the reward circuit (the 
dorsal striatum and in particular the caudate nucleus) is also 
activated when anticipating a reward (Delgado, 2007). Dopaminergic 
activity marks the divergence between the expected reward (based on 
experience) and the actual one. This process enables learning. 
Rewards act as positive reinforcement8 to increase the likelihood of 
goal-oriented actions.  
Currently, there is convergence towards the idea that the 
limbic system and in particular the amygdale bring information 
about the emotional value of stimuli and possible behavioral 
reactions to the orbitofrontal cortex. The latter uses this information 
to select behavioral responses according to their possible emotional 
effects, reward or punishment, via its projections to the dorsal 
prefrontal cortex (O’Doherty, 2004a and b; Ollat and Pirot, 2004).  
The entire striatum is involved in integrating affective, motor 
and cognitive information. In particular, it is activated when an 
individual receives or anticipates a primary or secondary reward. 
King Casas et al. (2005) show that after a few repetitions of the TG, 
player 2’s caudate nucleus, which had been activated after learning 
the amount sent by player 1, is then activated before player 1 sends 
an amount, illustrating a learning effect whereby player 2 anticipates 
player 1’s behavior. The intensity of the activity of the caudate 
nucleus is also a good signal of player 2’s return. 
Some research (Delgado, 2007) has focused on the respective 
roles of the dorsal and ventral striatum (more involved in cognitive 
and sensomotor functions) in their relationship with reward 
(obtained or anticipated). The dorsal striatum appears to play the 
role of assessing possible consequences of actions and learning 
action/reward connections (Balleine et al., 2007). According to 
Delgado et al. (2005a) and Haruno et al. (2004), the caudate nucleus 
is activated throughout the process of learning about the contingency 
                                            
8 Reinforcement is positive when the stimulus induces a pleasant effect and 
negative when it relieves an unpleasant (negative) sensation. In both cases, 
the stimulus leads to repetition. 
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between behavior and reward9. Once the reward is no longer 
informative, i.e. once it is correctly anticipated, the activity of the 
caudate nucleus declines. The authors deduce that “the human 
caudate nucleus is an integral component of a circuit involved in 
learning and updating current rewards with the purpose of guiding 
action that will maximize reward consumption” (Delgado, 2007, p. 
80). The limbic system is also involved in selection information to be 
memorised. Conversely, the representation and identification of the 
reward is more a function attributable to the frontal cortex10. 
Thus, the dorsal striatum appears to be involved in triggering 
and programming emotional responses, but also in reward-oriented 
responses, notably while preparing, initiating or executing behavior. 
This therefore suggests two activation modes for the reward circuit, 
reflecting the two operating modes of the brain. Some decisions are 
made according to an emotional mode, impulsively, routinely; other 
decisions follow a deliberative mode and result from reflection. Each 
of the two modes, while activating different areas of the brain, 
interacts with the other.  
Several research studies now establish the link between 
individual emotions and prosocial behavior. Notably, the reward 
circuit (i.e. striatum and insula) is activated in situations of altruism, 
charity, cooperation and fair punishment (Tabibnia et al., 2007), as 
well as when an individual anticipates a monetary gain or obtains 
one unexpectedly (Schultz et al., 1997; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005). 
The reward circuit is activated reflexively in cases of 
charitable behavior, which shows that individuals feel pleasure when 
donating to charitable associations dedicated to causes they support 
(Moll et al., 2006). But altruistic considerations can also prove 
“rewarding”. This is shown in a study by Harbaugh et al. (2007), 
which focused on public goods. Public goods financing via voluntary 
donations has two main determinants: “pure altruism”, whereby 
donors value the production of public goods, and “impure altruism”, 
motivated by the “warm glow effect” (i.e., the pleasure of giving). In 
the former, donors are concerned about the quantity of the public 
goods financed, regardless of the source of financing, whereas in the 
latter, the donor’s satisfaction lies more in the donation itself than in 
the quantity of the public goods it generates. The study’s authors 
shows that, to a certain extent, similar areas of the reward circuit are 
activated when a subject receives money, sees an association for 
                                            
9 More precisely, Haruno et al. (2004) showed that the dorsal striatum is 
activated by any action that individuals have perceived as being related to a 
reward. 
10 According to O’Doherty (2004a), the orbitofrontal cortex also encodes the 
reward stimulus. It is activated by reward or punishment (reinforcement), 
whereas repeated stimuli lead to a complete extinction of the cortical 
response if no reward or punishment follows (i.e. habituation). 
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public good financing receive funds, or gives freely to this 
association. 
An attitude of cooperation appears to work in the same way. 
Thus, in the case of a repeated TG, Delgado et al. (2005b) shows 
that, for player 1, the decision to share (i.e. to trust player 2) rather 
than to keep the full amount of money increases activity in the 
ventral striatum and the anterior insula, i.e. regions associated with 
the reward circuit. Symmetrically, Rilling et al. (2002, 2004) and 
Delgado et al. (2005b) highlight the fact that the ventral striatum and 
the anterior cingulate cortex are activated in player 2’s brain when 
he intends to cooperate, even before seeing the amount sent by 
player 1. The reward associated with loyal behavior is thus 
intermingled with that associated with being considered trustworthy 
(there is an externality relation between the act and the emotion, i.e. 
the person acting is not the one feeling the emotion). 
A context of reciprocity can also produce a reflexive pleasure. 
Thus, King Casas et al. (2005) showed during a repeated TG that 
player 2’s caudate nucleus is activated when he adopts loyal 
reciprocal behavior, after player 1 has shown his trust. The resulting 
pleasure is triggered by the trust shown by player 1 as much as by 
player 2’s intention to behave loyally and to honour the trust vested 
in him. Furthermore, the magnitude of this activation is positively 
correlated to the amount player 2 returns. In terms of punitive 
reciprocity, De Quervain et al. (2004) noted that the pain felt by a 
subject when he realises he is considered disloyal motivates a form of 
revenge (altruistic punishment) that brings pleasure to the one 
meting it out, as suggested by the activation of the dorsal striatum, 
lasting the time of this reaction. Apparently, the more severe the 
punishment, the more activity in this area. 
But the simple existence of a social relationship can also 
activate the reward circuit reflexively. Gains obtained following a 
successful social interaction with other individuals are a larger 
source of pleasure for subjects than gains obtained in the form of 
additional money in a non-social context. Thus, Rilling et al. (2002, 
2004) show that in an iterative prisoners’ dilemma, assuming 
constant monetary gains, the striatum is activated more when the 
partner is human rather than a computer. 
Even indirectly reflexive acts can become a source of emotion 
for protagonists via an empathy mechanism11. Singer et al. (2004) 
thus establish the fact that the reward circuit is activated in 
individuals who are shown the face of previously cooperative 
persons. This mechanism is even visible with regard to strangers 
                                            
11 Empathy consists of sharing others’ emotions simply by watching or 
imagining them in a particular state of being (see Preston Waal 2002 for a 
neurscientific model of empathy, as well as Singer et al., 2004b). 
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(Jackson et al., 2005; Morrison et al., 2004). Seeing individuals be 
punished that had previously showed loyal behavior increases the 
activity of the punishment circuit (the insula and the anterior 
cingulate cortex) of observers (Singer et al., 2006). Conversely, 
individuals (males) that witness unfair punishment of other 
individuals show an activation of the reward circuit (striatum).  
Some acts can induce a feeling of pleasure in others. Thus, 
the very feeling of being treated fairly or equitably, or even being 
considered trustworthy, produces pleasure, as does watching 
cooperative or loyal persons, even without interacting with them. On 
the contrary, being a victim of unfair behavior activates the physical 
disgust region (Sanfey et al., 2003). A common question is whether a 
fair proposal in the UG is also the one that generates the highest 
material gain. It thus becomes difficult to dissociate the emotional 
experience due to a proposal’s equity (or lack thereof) from that 
related to monetary gain. Yet Tabibnia et al. (2008) implemented a 
research protocol that enables these two dimensions to be 
dissociated. They thus supply information suggesting that a loyal 
proposal generates pleasure that activates the reward circuit (the 
ventral striatum, amygdale, ventromedial prefrontal cortex and 
orbitofrontal cortex). At the same time, when a proposal deemed 
disloyal is accepted (which implies “swallowing one’s pride”), the 
renouncement of punishment activates neural mechanisms that 
logically control the negative feeling and regulate emotions 
(decreased activity of the anterior insula, combined with a more 
intense activity of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex). In this case, 
the reward circuit is not activated.  
To conclude, emotional factors are essential parameters in the 
decision-making process in the case of punishment and reprisals 
inflicted for disloyal or inequitable behavior. Emotional experience 
has a significant influence on whether a proposal is accepted or 
refused in the ultimatum game, whether as a consequence of the 
game situation (Espinoza et al., 2004) or as a driver of the game 
(Harlé and Sanfey, 2007). Thus, Petit (2009) showed that individuals 
filled with indignation or anger reject substantially more inequitable 
proposals than subjects that feel positive emotions. This also appears 
to be confirmed by the fact that a high level of testosterone is 
correlated with punishment of inequitable proposals (Burnham, 
2007) due to the high “self-esteem” of dominating individuals12. 
Lastly, the neuroimagery work of Sanfey et al. (2003) concludes that 
a disloyal proposal is associated with negative emotional responses 
(i.e. activation of the anterior insula), whereas De Quervain et al. 
(2004) show that a partner’s disloyal attitude is a source of suffering 
for the individual that is betrayed. 
                                            
12 This hormone is linked to behavior aimed at domination. 
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Prosocial behavior thus results from the individual’s 
immediate emotional experience. More particularly, charity, 
reciprocity, altruistic punishment and positive social interaction 
generate gratification that is identical, from the endocrinal and 
neural standpoint, to economic gains. These findings appear to 
support the hypothesis that these attitudes have egocentric 





The emotion triggered by altruism, empathy, reciprocity, 
equity, charity or altruistic punishment appears to modify how 
economists have classified and understood these attitudes. These 
behaviors are described as prosocial in that they are allocentric (i.e. 
oriented towards others) and are part of a social relationship 
(Behrens et al., 2009). However, as they are associated with the 
neural mechanisms of the reward and punishment circuits, they 
have egocentric determinants. We can thus postulate that, while 
such behavior is undoubtedly motivated by concern for others or by 
social norms, it is nevertheless centred on the individual that derives 
pleasure or displeasure. Depending on the context, the cognitive 
processes (learning, interpretation) and the individual’s personality 
(reactiveness), a prosocial attitude would thus have egocentric 
determinants resulting from emotional experience.  
This approach enables the concept of “self-interest” to be 
expanded upon and surpassed. The determinant of a decision/action 
would no longer be strict economic self-interest13 but rather the sum 
of emotional experiences (gratification, pain avoidance, etc.), felt 
viscerally or calling on deliberative processes.  
Indeed, neuroscience has indicated that emotions generate 
information that influences decision-making, and the absence of 
emotion in subjects following serious cranial injury may even result 
in an incapacity to make decisions. Recent progress highlights 
leading indicators of decisions by identifying changes in neural 
activity a few seconds before a decision is made. For instance, 
Knutson and Greer (2008) point out that the emotion triggered by 
anticipation of a monetary reward, and identified by neural activity, 
could affect or predict the subject’s choice. Activation of the nucleus 
accumbens, which reflects a certain degree of excitation for the 
subject, predicts a purchasing decision. Likewise, as explained 
                                            
13 A. Hirschman (1980) already showed that the equivalence between “self-
interest” and “economic self-interest” resulted from a gradual restriction of 
meaning. 
Economie et Institutions – n°16 – 1e semestre 2011 
 
48 
above, Rilling et al. (2002) and Delgado (2005b) show that a player’s 
behavior can be anticipated based on the activity of the ventral 
striatum and the anterior cingulate cortex. 
As the search for emotional reward can thus be a driver in the 
decision to act, it may be a major reason for prosocial behavior. 
These discoveries open the way to a better understanding of the 
deliberative decision-making system by factoring in the true role 
played by emotions. Integrated into a theoretical framework derived 
from the economic tradition, these discoveries would mean that when 
individuals are faced with a choice, they compare reward 
anticipations for each option and seek to optimise their decision by 
choosing what offers the highest anticipated reward. According to 
O’Doherty (2004) and Sanfey et al. (2006), the individual’s dilemma is 
one of exploration/exploitation14, i.e. to arbitrate between exploring 
new sources of reward and exploiting maximum satisfaction from a 
given source of pleasure. In the latter case, the emotional influence 
would be integrated into a calculation of the probability of realising 
the expected utility (Mellers and McGraw, 2001; Schultz, 2006). 
Homo becomes sapiens but is still equipped with perfect rationality 
enabling the value of emotions to be calculated, anticipated pleasure 
(or displeasure) to be assessed, and action to be taken based on a 
cost/reward calculation (for instance, between the pleasure derived 
from punishing disloyal behavior and that resulting from receiving a 
small monetary amount).  
By revealing the reward aspect of prosocial behavior, 
neuroscience has shown that these situations are not just sources of 
“costs” for subjects. Now, we know more about how the deliberative 
process is carried out in the case of “problematic” decisions, in which 
the subject’s convictions, beliefs, preferences and affects are in 
conflict (e.g. in the case of choosing between the monetary loss of 
making a gift and the emotional reward related to the warm glow 
effect of giving). The resulting emotion could thus be integrated into a 
logical framework. This appears to be the case, for instance, when 
activity in the prefrontal cortex – involved in assessing a decision’s 
costs/benefits – is stronger for a costly punishment than for a 
punishment that implies no costs. Likewise, subjects that show 
higher activity in the striatum in the case of a punishment implying 
no costs will also be those that agree to pay a higher price in the case 
of a costly punishment. 
In a UG, Sanfey et al. (2003) show that the insula’s activity 
enables us to predict whether a proposal will be accepted or rejected. 
Intense activity reflects a high probability of rejection, as the insula 
reflects the state of emotional disgust of the subject that has received 
an unfair proposal. Likewise, activity in the prefrontal dorsolateral 
                                            
14 These terms were initially developed by J. March (1991). 
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cortex – involved in the execution of tasks, pursuit of a goal, memory 
– enables us to predict, to a certain extent, that an unfair proposal 
will be accepted, as reason outweighs the negative emotion triggered 
by the proposal. Going even further, Van't Wout et al. (2005) 
disrupted the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex using transcranial 
magnetic stimulation, and observed an increase in the probability of 
an unfair proposal being rejected. This is because a disruption in the 
prefrontal cortex cancels its moderating effect, and the disgust 
triggered by the unfair proposal is no longer counterbalanced by the 
prospect of a monetary gain. 
Along the same lines, but with a different intention, the work 
of Etkin et al. (2006) makes it possible to distinguish between the 
detection of an emotional conflict and its resolution. As in Sanfey et 
al. (2003) and Van't Wout et al. (2008), the activity of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and the amygdale signals the existence of a 
cognitive and emotional conflict. Etkin et al. (2006) also highlight the 
fact that the resolution of these conflicts is associated with activation 
of the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rostral ACC). The higher its 
activity, the stronger the conflict. Yet this activation of the rostral 
ACC tends to decrease the activity of the amygdale, reflecting a 
reduction in the internal emotional and cognitive conflict. 
Do these cerebral mechanisms signify that emotions are an 
additional variable for optimising decision-making within the process 
of formal rationality?15  
Since leading indicators cannot be predicted, we note only a 
slight increase in our level of understanding of decision-making 
mechanisms. Depending on the individual, the warm glow effect is 
more or less strong; the disgust triggered by an unfair proposal is not 
the same for everyone, and emotional and cognitive conflicts are 
largely shaped by the subject’s life experiences. Thus, the 
determinants of emotions remain unpredictable, for they are 
determined by the environment, genes, education, and so forth. The 
highly subjective nature of emotional experiences appears to explain 
the wide variety of individual behaviors when faced with the same 
choices. Even approaches based on variants of the expected utility 
theory integrating anticipated pleasure show that the same objective 
result can be the source of very divergent emotional experiences 
(Mellers and McGraw, 2001). The pleasure or displeasure 
experienced shows the egocentric character of prosocial behavior but 
does not enable us to consider emotional experiences as a simple 
preference in a bundle of goods.  
                                            
15 Generally speaking, decision theory contrasts rational decisions based on 
calculation and “emotionally guided” decisions that go beyond reason or 
employ pseudo-ratinality to justify behavior triggered by emotions. 
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Furthermore, there are sociocognitive biases that disrupt 
decision-making. The deliberative mechanism is not infallible and 
subjects can be victims of it. Thus, Delgado et al. (2005b) carried out 
an experiment in which they manipulated the content of information 
provided to subjects in a TG. They discovered that when subjects 
have a positive preconception on their partner, the activity of the 
caudate nucleus is undifferentiated according to the partner’s 
generosity or selfishness. Subjects appear not to take advantage of 
the information contained in player 2’s responses, as if the individual 
profiles at their disposal were sufficient. In addition, there is 
dissonance between the partner’s perception (evaluated at the start 
and end of the experiment) and the sharing decision. Subjects are 
more clear-minded in their statements (i.e. saying what they think of 
their partners) than in their choices. They continue to share with 
individuals whose profile suggests they are reliable and loyal, 
whereas their statements indicate they do not consider them to be 
more reliable than others. It would thus appear that moral 
preconceptions bias perceptions and have a neural effect. In an 
entirely different field, Bourgeois-Gironde and Guille (in this issue) 
cast light on neuroscientific work notably involving the monetary 
illusion, while Bourgeois-Gironde and Aharon (also in this issue) 
insist on the means at the disposal of politicians to encourage 
individuals to break with their behavioral biases. In a different way, 
some recent cerebral imagery research studying the impact of 
“framing” postulates that emotional experience dominates reasoning 
(De Martino et al., 2006) because the framing of a problem has a 
different emotional effect: “keeping 40%” or “losing 60%” of a given 
amount of money is not transcribed in the same way emotionally, 
and leads to different behaviors. 
Up to now, neuroeconomics research has focused more on 
deliberative decision-making, and this orientation reflects traditional 
economic analysis. Yet it would appear that there are indeed two 
decision-making systems. The types of decisions examined up to now 
are part of the deliberative, controlled system, which is different from 
the automatic, routine and purely affective system, to reuse the 
dichotomy laid out by Sloman (2002) and Kahneman (2003). In fact, 
these two systems coexist. The former arbitrates between gains and 
losses according to their relative importance and activates areas of 
the brain such as the dorsolateral and anterior prefrontal cortex and 
the posterior parietal cortex. The latter activates areas such as the 
amygdale, the insula cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex, the ACC and 
the nucleus accumbens. This second system takes greater account of 
emotion and triggers, in particular, routine behavior, the use of 
behavioral heuristics and reflexive responses.  
Non-conscious sensations and expected emotional 
gratifications intervene and guide behavior. Damasio (1994) 
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hypothesised the existence of somatic markers. The orbitofrontal 
cortex generates unconscious physiological signals that precede and 
influence the cognitive evaluation and reasoning process when a 
decision is being made. By introducing a distinction between 
immediate emotions at the time of the decision and expected 
emotions according to the result of the decision, Loewenstein et al. 
(2001) underscored that models of expected utility integrate expected 
emotions but not immediate emotions. Backing proposals put forth 
by Simon (1967), Loewenstein and his team even conclude that in 
situations involving a divergence between emotional experience and 
cognitive evaluation (i.e. formal rationality), behavior is guided by 
emotions rather than reason. In this perspective, it would be 
necessary to take into account the influence of “visceral” factors 
(Loewenstein, 2000) in order to understand economic behaviors, 
including intertemporal choices.  
The research work carried out by Sanfey et al. (2006) is 
probably the best reflection of the current state of knowledge in this 
field, as it proposes a balanced interpretation. This study reveals that 
when faced with a disloyal proposal in a UG, two regions of the brain 
are activated in particular: the anterior insula and the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex. The former region is correlated to emotional 
processes and the latter to deliberative processes, and as a result, 
the relative degree of activation explains whether the proposal is 
accepted or rejected. These results back the idea of an interaction 
between the two systems, which also appears to be consistent with 
the results obtained by De Quervain et al. (2004) and King Cassas et 
al.. (2005). Sanfey and Chang (2008) propose a description of the 
neural contours of these two systems, but their interaction and the 
conditions for their competition/cooperation have yet to be clarified.  
The teachings of neuroscience show the complexity of 
cerebral processes when faced with an internal or external stimulus, 
a fact that illustrates the need for caution when attempting to 
explain individual decisions. In light of all the factors explained in 
this article, we would propose that prosocial behavior results from an 
individual’s emotional experience, which, as it is both distinct from 
and linked to calculative deliberative mechanisms and normative 
behaviors (due to the subject belonging to a social group), activates 
the neural circuits for reward (immediate pleasure or the search for 
pleasure) and punishment (immediate displeasure or the avoidance 
of displeasure). Prosocial behavior could thus be considered a 
product of several non-mutually exclusive determinants that are 
distinguished by their being extrinsic (for material incentives and 
social norms) or intrinsic (motivation, emotion).  
From an evolutionary standpoint, we can therefore suppose 
that the neural bases of prosocial behavior were selected in a process 
of biological, anatomic and social co-evolution. In increasingly 
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complex and highly organised human groups, the constant 
combination of antagonistic and cooperative behaviors was the 
foundation for survival (Morin, 1973). In this perspective, individual 
fulfilment, which cannot be dissociated from social fulfilment, would 
imply such a combination – variable and imbalanced, depending on 
the individuals and the context – that results in pleasure and 
gratification, or pain and frustration. Cooperation would also be part 
of human social and biological nature as much as selfish and 
antagonistic behaviors. In this respect, the simplistic portrait of homo 
economicus must be completed with the “invisible hand” of emotions 
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